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Postdated checks are a chronic affliction in financially anaemic
communities and they break out elsewhere often enough to war-
rant notice. If the results of a rather widespread inquiry are
to be believed, they are cordially disliked by bankers, merchants,
and tradespeople for the reason chiefly that they are too often
drawn against only the flimsiest expectation of funds and they
accordingly come back bearing the evidence of their worthless-
ness on their face.
It is proposed here to consider their status during the embryo
stage between the date they are issued and the date they bear
and to inquire specifically what is the legal effect of their trans-
fer to a third person during that period.
At the outset, however, it may be well to dispose of certified
postdated checks and the responsibility of the certifying bank to
the holder, because that issue is sometimes confused with the
subject now in hand. As to such a state of facts the law is well
enough settled against the holder. Either because it is patently
ultra vires on the part of the bank or beyond the apparent au-
thority of the certifying officer, the bank is not liable to him on
the premature certification.1 The latter argument, it will be
noticed, might be equally applicable to the isszanee of postdated
checks by officers of corporations or agents of individuals or by
1 Swenson Bros. v. Commercial State Bank, 98 Neb. '702, 154 N. W. 233
(1915) (president exceeded authority; also said not to be "ordinary banking
business"); Farmers & Mech. Bank v. Butchers & Drovers Bank, 16 N. Y.
125, 129 (1857) (ultra vires); Clarke Nat. Bank v. Bank of Albion, 52
Barb. 592 (N. Y. 1868); Pope v. Bank of Albion, 57 N. Y. 126, 130 (1874)
(decided chiefly on another ground); Wilson v. Mid-West State Bank, 103
Iowa 311, 314, 186 N. W. 891, 893 (1922); Luduc v. Banque d'Hochelaga,
[1926] Can. Sup. Ct. 76 (only the certification itself was postdated).
In Russell Grader Mfg. Co. v. Farmers Exch. State Bank, 49 N. D. 999,
194 N. W. 387 (1923), a separate letter stating that "the [postdated] check
will be paid on that date," was held by the court, under the facts, to bind
the defendant bank as an "independent undertaking in the nature of a
letter of credit within banking powers." "No evidence was offered to show
that defendant made this undertaking without consideration or . .
security."
So in the absence of statute with certification of time bill of exchange.
Ingersoll v. Kansas State Bank, 109 Kan. 534, 202 Pac. 837 (1921); Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 181 Wis. 172, 194 N. W. 427
(1923). And of a non-commercial instrument in the general form of a
check but conditional. Fidelity & Dep. Co. of Md. v. Nat. Bank of. Com-
merce, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 301, 306, 106 S. W. 732, 784 (1907). Contra:
Smith v. Field, 19 Idaho 558, 114 Pac. 668 (1911) (only question involved
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one partner for a partnership.2  Unless there was specific au-
thority given, the holder who took such paper would have notice
that it was signed in excess of authority just as he would be
aware of the same thing in the case of certifications. This is
rather a matter of agency than of negotiable instruments, but
the inquiry is narrowed nevertheless by this observation to the
unusual situation of an agent actually authorized to draw post-
dated checks or to the common case of an individual drawer of
such paper, the one with which we are here concerned.
In order to determine the legal effect of transferring a post-
dated check, assuming it to be a valid instrument,3 it is necessary
to consider three distinct matters:
(1) whether a postdated check is negotiable.
(2) whether the date on such a check is notice of the draw-
er's possible "equities."
(3) whether such a check is regular.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that when we have
determined what effect should be given to the transfer of a
was whether check certified before its date and now admitted to be good
constituted good deposit under local statutes re appeals); Farmers Nat.
Bank v. Ill. Nat. Bank, 146 Ill. App. 136 (1908) (telegraph promise to honor
draft on individual held not to be ultra vires where drawee was apparently
customer and bank profited from his business); Exchange Bank v. La
Banque du Peuple, Mont. L. R. 3 Q. B. 232 (1886), aff'd, 23 Can. L. J.
(N. S.) 391, 3 judges dissenting. However, under federal law, banks are
expressly authorized to certify or accept certain kinds of time paper for
specified purposes in furtherance of American foreign trade and to provide
dollar exchange. FEDERAL RESERvE Act § 13 as amended by Acts of Sept.
7, 1916 and June 21, 1917, 12 U. S. C. §§ 372-373 (1926). And see Berton
v. Central Bank, 10 N. B. 493 (1863). As to a taker after the date on the
face of the check, such a certification might be binding despite the fact that
it was affixed prematurely and without authority, unless it was dated
earlier than the check so as to give notice to any taker that it was prema-
ture and unauthorized. Quacre though, whether one must examine the date
of certifications. Cf. Merchants & Planters Bank v. New First Nat. Bank,
116 Ark. 1, 170 S. W. 852 (1914); NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 11.
2 Forster v. Mackreth, L. R. 2 Ex. 163 (1867) (member of firm of attor-
neys having authority to draw checks but not to issue bills; hence no au-
thority to issue postdated checks). And even authority in an agent of a
corporation to draw regular bills does not carry with it by implication
authority to draw postdated bills. New York Iron Mine v. Citizens Bank,
44 Mich. 344, 6 N. W. 823 (1880). But cf. Commonwealth v. Woolis, infra
note 59, allowing criminal prosecution against one for issuance of postdated
check without funds by general manager of his store.
3 The English cases about to be considered present the issue squarely as
,one of validity. In other countries it seems to be rather a question of legal-
ity: a penalty is prescribed for falsely dating a check. COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF THE WORLD, FRANCE 189 (6); TODD, BELGIAN LAW, art. 5, p. 434; HANG,
COiMERCIAL CODE OF JAPAN, art. 536, p. 226. See COMMERCIAL LAWS oF
THE WORLD, SPAIN 152.
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postdated check, we shall then be in a position to answer the
question of whether it is negotiable and regular-those attrib-
utes being effects rather than causes. But no judge seems ever
to have thought of going at it that way, and it is necessary at
all events to know what has been decided.
BRITISH CASES
The British decisions, relied on to a considerable degree in
the United States, do not deal with these problems as clearly as
might be desired because of the presence in those cases of a
non-commercial factor, the Documentary Stamp Tax Acts, which
gave rise primarily to the question of validity.
At an early date the Crown imposed a tax on credit instru-
ments which increased proportionately with the time the paper
had to run. Englishmen saw the chance to use postdated
checks for bills at so many days or months and economize on
the stamps. The government retaliated by making postdated
checks taxable as bills with a corresponding date for payment,
and sought to make this program effective by various statutes
declaring unstamped or understamped paper of this sort inad-
missible in evidence s or void.
4 See Allen v. Keeves, 1 East. 435 (1801). So under the German Check
Law. 2 C0ammRcAL LAWs OF THE WoRLD, GERMANY 509, § 29. See also
Erle, C. J., in Whistler v. Forster, 14 C. B. (N. s.) 248, 255 (1863): "This
is an action against the drawer of a bill of exchange, for, though in form a
check, the instrument is, for all the purposes of the Stamp Actq, a bill."
(Italics ours). That a postdated check is therefore for any other purpose
the same thing as a time bill cannot of course be contended. See 1 Moars,
BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §§ 376-385; Jones, Liability of the Mafcr
of a Check (1892) 6 H-uv. L. REV. 138; the discussion of Lord Blackburn
in McLean v. Clydesdale Banking Co., 9 App. Cas. 95, 105-108 (1883) ; that
of Cooley, J., in New York Iron Mine v. Citizens Bank, supra note 2, at
357, 6 N. W. at 829; and that of Lord Coleridge, C. J., dissenting in Currie
v. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 153, 167-169 (1875). Substantial differences between
checks and bills persist in the Negotiable Instruments Law; for example,
the "stale check rule" [NORTON, BILLS & NOTES (4th ed. 1914) 577-582],
and the extent to which tardy presentment discharges the maker-wholly,
as to bills (NEGOTIABLE INsTRU MuNTS LAW § 70); only as he loses, on
checks (NEGOTIABLE INSTRumENTS LAW § 186). And as to the time for
presentation of a postdated check, see Rose, J., in Philadelphia Life Ins. Co.
v. Hayworth, 296 Fed. 339, 342 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); ef. Taylor v. Sip, 30
N. J. L. 284 (1863); Mohawk Bank v. Broderick, 10 Wend. 304 (N. Y.
1833). There can be, of course, no justification for calling a chech unre-
servedly what it is not except with reservations and then reasoning from
this tottering premise to general conclusions about checks. A bill payable
"on demand" after a specified future date would bear more perfect rezem-
blance to a postdated check, but even that unusual style of instrument would
not be identical.
5 See, e. g., Field v. Woods, 7 A. & E. 114 (1837), also holding it unnec-
essary to plead the postdating. But cf. as to Canada on this point, Vaughan
v. Roberts, 23 N. B. 343, 350 (1883) and citations. Sea also Ede v.
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In cases arising under these acts it mattered not who held the
paper; the objections to its validity or admissibility were avail-
able against either payees or third party holders for value I and
by those who had no defence on the merits against anyone.
Indeed, and this further illustrates the governmental and non-
commercial nature of the question in these cases, the clerk of
the court was required to raise the objection when interested
parties did not." It is therefore apparent that in cases under
these statutes, where the paper was held void or was excluded
from the record on the ground of violating the revenue acts, the
proceedings would be halted short of any question of negoti-
ability. Correspondingly, a decision on whatever grounds that
it was not void under those statutes but valid and admissible
Knowles, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 172 (1843) (headnote-instrument admissible in
evidence to prove its own invalidity); Watson v. Poulson, 15 Jur. 1111
(1851) (likewise to prove fraud); cf. the characteristic language of Lord
Ellenborough, C. J., concerning ordinary unstamped check. "I have not
legal optics to see its existence." Borrodaile v. Middleton, 2 Camp. 63, 55
(1809).6 Whitwell v. Bennett, 3 Bos. & P. 559 (1803); Serle v. Norton, 9 X, &
W. 309 (1842); see Carrington v. Pell, 3 De G. & S. 512, 515 (1849). And
that a postdated check may, under some statutes, have been illegal beyond
cure by stamp, see Key v. Mathias, 3 F. & F. 279, 281 (1862). This pro-
gram of Parliament, however, the courts seriously hampered in some cases
by testing the sufficiency of the stamp as it appeared when offered in evi-
dence so that time passing before suit begun would gently efface the fault
of a check or bill originally postdated. Cf. Upstone v. Marchant, 2 B. & C.
10 (1823); Williams v. Jarrett, 5 B. & Ald. 32 (1833), criticised but grudg-
ingly followed in Austin v. Bunyard, 6 B. & S. 687 (1865); also followed
in Bull v. O'Sullivan, L. R. 6 Q. B. 209 (1871); and in Gatty v. Fry,.2 Ex.
D. 265 (1877). Under such holdings the check could not be said to be void
whatever the statute declared it. Cf. Watson v. Poulson, supra note 5. But
later two judges at nisi prius tried the issue of postdating as a collateral
matter, an entirely useless proceeding if the date on the check itself were
to be taken as the test of its admissibility. See Dunsford v. Curlewis, 1
F. & F: 702" (1859) ; Key v. Mathias, supra. The variations in statutes and
the difference between order and bearer instruments or between admissibil-
ity and validity may account for some of these results. See explanatory
comment of Blackburn, J., in Austin v. Bunyard, supra at 691. The dis-
advantages of interrupting a trial by such collateral inquiry were men-
tioned by Cleasby, B., in Gatty v. Fry, supra at 267. It does not seem
worth while to examine the seeming inconsistencies further herein. Some
of the statutes, at least, imposed penalties on persons issuing or receiving
insufficiently stamped paper. See, e.g., Martin v. Morgan, 3 Moore 635,
638 (1819). But under this type of act the paper was illegal also. Ibid.;
Swan v. Bank of Scotland, 10 Bligh (N. s.) 627 (1836). Where depositor
"overdraws" account by such void instruments to the knowledge of the bank,
the latter cannot recover from sureties responsible for overdrafts.7
-See Serle v. Norton, supra note, 6. In some of the cases it was not even
thought of enough moment to point out whether the plaintiff was the payee
or an indQrsee, holder for value. See, e.g., Allen v. Keeves, supra note 4.
S Oliver v. Mortimer, 2 F. & F. 127 (1860); Austin v. Bunyard, supra
note 6, at 688.
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would have not the slightest bearing on the question of its nego-
tiability or regularity while postdated. Moreover, unless in addi-
tion the drawer raised or attempted to raise defenses on the
merits, there would be nothing in the case to invite consideration
of our problem.9 Despite that fact, however, there was and con-
tinues to be occasional confusion of the two ideas in the language
of the courts.'0 And furthermore, even though the judicial
softening of the rigor of this legislation in favor of those who
took at a later date without being aware of the postdating may
have served to create a class of innocent purchasers in whose
hands the paper was valid and available,' I that class was in no
sense the class with which this article has to deal, i. e., those who
take for value before the expressed issuing date of the paper
9 So in Upstone v. Marchant (indorsee ifgainst acceptor of postdated bill) ;
Williams v. Jarrett; Austin v. Bunyard; Key v. Mathias; Bull v. O'Sulli-
van; Gatty v. Fry, all supra note 6; Carpenter v. Street, 6 T. L. R. 410
(1890) (all actions against the drawer by indorsees for value but with
knowledge of the postdating). If the drawers in fact had any meritorious
defense in these cases, it would in all probability have been asserted, for
able counsel such as those who appeared for the defendants must certainly
have seen the point. To assume then that they knowingly omitted to pre-
sent such a defense would require the further assumption either that the
law was considered too well established against them to warrant raising
the issue, which is certainly doubtful, or that British business understand-
ing in the use of postdated check was uniformly and unquestionably in
favor of their negotiability from the moment of issue. Whether this was
or is so the present writer does not know, but the fact that the question
has been since frequently litigated seems to him some evidence that at least
it was not. Some of the above cases may be disposed of on another ground,
i.e., that the paper was taken by the plaintiff for value on or after its date,
at which time it appeared regular and negotiable in all respects. Williams
v. Jarrett, Austin v. Bunyard, both supra note 6. So also, London & Cty.
Banking Co. v. Groome, 8 Q. B. D. 288 (1881) ; Dunsford v. Curlewi"s, npra
note 6; Ex parte Richdale, 19 Ch. D. 409 (1881) (holder's rights were not
litigated). Whistler v. Forster, supra note 4, going off on the ground that
the paper being taken by the plaintiff without indorsement was taken sub-
ject to the drawer's defenses, gave no occasion to consider or decide whether
it might not likewise have been taken subject to defenses because received
postdated, though there can be no doubt but that the court did not so think
of it.
10 Kay, L. J., in Royal Bank v. Tottenham, 64 L. J. 99, 101 (1894): "But
the Bills of Exchange Act expressly says that a bill is not invalid by reason
only that it is postdated. If it was not an invalid cheque, it was proper
to negotiate it before its date and to deal with it as valid." This exact
language is not found in the Law Reports, [1S94] 2 Q. B. 715. In Car-
penter v. Street, supra note 9, it is said, "The defense set up was that when
Carpenter took the cheque it was not 'regular on the face of it' and was not
legally valid."
13 This was the actual result of the decision in Austin v. Bunyard, supra.
note 6, and particularly the view of Blackburn, J., ibid. 696) although the
majority of the court, feeling bound by certain precedent, did not limit
their decision to permitting an innocent taker to sue. Cf. remark of Cleas-
by, B., in Gatty v. Fry, supra note 6, at 266, and decision in that case.
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and who then know from the face of the instrument itself that
it is postdated. It would therefore be profitless to pursue the
matter further.
This summary will be found on analysis to dispose of most
of the British cases in which questions were raised concerning
postdated checks. Space forbids detailed consideration here of
any but a few of the others.
In Hitchcock v. Edwards,12 a check was made by the defendant
and delivered to the payee on September 5th, dated September
8th and transferred for value to the plaintiff on September 6th.
It was contended by the drawee-defendant that the check was
not complete and regular on its face when transferred to the
payee in that it was then postdated and bore only a penny
stamp, that the plaintiff therefore was not a holder in due
course, and that the defendants might set up against him certain
defenses. Cave, J., held for the plaintiff, and his oral opinion
seems squarely to have decided (1) that the check was not
invalid provided it appeared properly stamped when offered in
evidence, and (2) that it was regular and negotiable before its
date. As authority for both of these propositions the court
depended entirely on the case of Gatty v. Fry. "That is a de-
cision that is binding on me sitting as a judge of the first
instance. . . . Before the defendants can succeed they must get
rid of Gatty v. Frj."
But Gatty v. Fry, one of the cases cited above,13 decided noth-
ing about negotiability or commercial regularity and the defend-
ant failed to show in that case that he had any defense on the
merits which would make it material whether the plaintiff took
by negotiation or by mere assignment. The only issue there was
one of validity. As authority on that proposition it is sufficient;
for more than that it is not, and Hitchcock v. Edwards loses in
turn some of its persuasiveness as authority on commercial law
for being bottomed on that non-commercial precedent.
But it may be urged that the matter of irregularity was argued
and considered and the pertinent section of the Bills of Exchange
Act 14 was pressed upon the judge's attention. True, but there
12 60 L. T. R. 636 (1889); approved in Royal Bank v. Tottenham, supra
note 10.
1 Supra notes 6 and 9.
14 BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT § 29: "A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken a bill complete and regular on the face of it .... " Nao-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52: "A holder in due course is a holder who
has taken the instrument under the following conditions: 1. That it Is
complete and regular on its face." The Negotiable Instruments Law sec-
tions will be later considered in detail but this section being but a codifica-
tion of the law merchant [Hunter v. Bacon, 127 App. ,Div. 572, 111 N. Y.
Supp. 820 (1st Dep't 1908)] adds no complication to this or the other
British decisions under it.
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is apparent in the argument an unmistakable interweaving and
confusion of this section of codified commercial law with the
stamp acts-revenue law. The irregularity of the check is
sought to be made out by a combination of these two; it was
irregular when the plaintiff took it, not because it was then post-
dated, the commercial reason if there is one, but because, being
postdated, it then bore an insufficient stamp to the knowledge
of the taker. What the court failed to consider and what was
never sharply and clearly presented to it for consideration was
the question of irregularity under the law merchant and the
Bills of Exchange Act alone, in which case matters of commercial
convenience and mercantile custom would doubtless have re-
ceived attention.3
A much earlier case, Pamnore v. North,2 concerned a post-
dated bill and therefore involved elements not present in check
cases, notably the fact that a bill is a time or credit instrument
rather than a cash order; but it is the most extensively reasoned
case on the problem of postdating commercial paper and there-
fore demands review. The defendant on May 4, 1810 drew a
bill on a London firm, dating it May 11, but immediately deliver-
ing it to the payee, one Totty. On the next day, May 5, Totty
endorsed it to the plaintiff for value and later that day was
killed by a fall from his horse. Hearing of this, the defendant
stopped payment on the bill and resisted its collection in this
action. It may be taken as a fact, although it is not entirely
clear, that the consideration for the bill failed in part; at least
the defendant owed Totty, the payee, less than the amount of it
when accounts were balanced. The question as stated by the
plaintiff's counsel was "whether the bill having been drawn and
indorsed to the plaintiff before the day that it bears date, and
the payee having died before that day, it was a negotiable instru-
ment at the time, within the custom of merchants, so that the
payee could convey a title to it by his indorsement to the plain-
tiff." He argued that the date was not material except to fix the
time of payment, which here it sufficiently did. Littledale for
the defendant contended, however, that "The bill never had any
operation by the custom of merchants, which does not apply to
an instrument carrying a false appearance and deception upon
the face of it. It was only meant to be taken as issued at the
time of the date, and until that day it was not a negotiable
instrument, however it might bind the drawer to answer for the
- It seems likely also that there was no valid defense on the merits in
Hitchcock v. Edwards, supra note 12. The one presented was that defendant
drawer had been garnished by creditors of the payee before the date of the
check. There being no duty to stop payment on the check for the benefit
of these creditors [Ex parte Richdale, supra note 6], it may be that there is
no privilege of doing so as against a purchaser for value.
1G 13 East 517 (1811).
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amount to the payee or his executors." 17 (This last contention
smacks more of the common-law problem about the assignability
of choses in action, the question of whether the owner can give
as much as he has, or anything at all, than of negotiability, the
question of whether he can give more than he has, launder his
dirty paper and free it of defenses.)
It may be, therefore, that the question of negotiability was
not as directly raised and settled in Pasmore v. North as at first
appears, but it is not proposed to side-step the case in this
fashion but to accept it as deciding exactly what it has been
considered to decide and to examine the sufficiency of the reasons
for the decision.
There can, in the first place, be no criticism of Lord Ellen-
borough's disposition of the fraud argument. So long as the
paper circulates postdated, that fact is apparent; during that
time it could be at most an evident fraud on the revenue. When
once the day scheduled for its debut arrives, it may be deceptive
in suggesting that the day specified was really the day of its
"coming out," but the deception is harmless, for takers there-
after are, if anything, benefited by their ignorance."' And there
can be no doubt either of the correctness of Lord Ellenborough's
position in demanding pointedly of counsel: "Does he mean to
say that it was in abeyance in the intermediate time between the
issuing of it and the date?" From the moment of its delivery
to Totty the bill had some legal significance. But neither of
these things, of course, decides that the instrument is or ought
to be negotiable before its date.
17 The explanation of this argument may be as follows:
(1) An ordinary chose in action was not assignable at common-law.
(2) Certain special choses in action, commercial instruments, were made
assignable by the law merchant; in fact they were made more than assign-
able-negotiable.
(3) The term "negotiable" was undoubtedly used originally to indicate
assignable in such a manner as to permit suit by the assignee in his own
name. See language of the statute of 3 & 4 ANN. c. 9, § 1 (1704); Shaw
v. N. Penn. R. R, 101 U. S 557 (1879). It is still so used, but it may be
employed in a more exact and discriminating sense to mean assignable in
such a manner as to cut off personal defenses. It is so used by the writer.
In the case of Pasmore v. North, supra note 16, it is evident that Littledalo,
from the emphasis he placed on the death of the indorser, was thinking of
strict assignability when he spoke of the instrument as being non-negoti-
able, though he gave a reason which was equally applicable to either use
of the term, i.e., that this was not at its issuing date such an instrument
as the law merchant was concerned with. In so far as the case may de-
pend upon the legal assignability of the instrument, its possible operation
as a power of attorney coupled with an interest, and the right of the as-
signee to sue in the name of the deceased payee or of his executor, the sub-
ject is beyond the scope of this paper. See Cook, The Alienability of Chosea
in Action (1917) 30 HARv. L. REY. 449.
18 See suprd note 11.
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The remaining remark of the learned Lord Chief Justice is
the one which would lend the most support to that contention:
"A bill without any date would still be a good bill: then why is
not this as good?" If by this is meant good as a time bill and
operative from delivery as such, hence negotiable in the correct
sense of that term,19 nothing could be more faulty by way of
analogy. There is a clear and irhportant difference between
failing to date a bill and postdating it, whether the failure to
date is careless or intentional. In the case of carelessly failing
to date, the very lack of thought on the subject is most per-
suasive evidence of the drawer's indifference and willingness
that the bill be immediately negotiable; if he cared he would
have thought; 2 0 and in addition, there is no reason why business
should be held in check for the protection of heedless persons.
In the case of deliberately omitting the date, the author of the
bill takes the ordinary principal's risk with his eyes open and
cannot complain of results.
On the other hand, consider the case of postdating. It is an
affirmative act, ordinarily represents thought and is done for a
purpose.21 The bill is placed in the hands of the payee with
evidence of that fact upon its face. To say, therefore, as did
LeBlanc, J., in Pasmore v. North, "that the very party who now
set up the defense that this was not a negotiable instrument,
was the person who issued it into the world as such," 2 is to beg
the question. He sent it forth differing from the ordinary com-
mercial instrument in a noteworthy particular, subject to the
chance that the courts might declare it regular and negotiable
whenever a case arose requiring a decision on that point. But
why create new rights in unusual paper?-a thing justifiable
only in furtherance of the turnover of such paper as is in due
course.
39 In view of the form which the later English codification of the law
merchant took (see infra note 42), there is some justification for believing
that negotiability was not meant by this rhetorical inquiry. If that is true,
Lord Ellenborough's opinion decided the case without meeting the issue of
negotiability by a single valid reason.
20 This, of course, is not intended as a subjective test of the negotiability
of a particular bill.
21 It is not overlooked that there are cases of careless misdating too, but
no reason is perceived why they should influence the rule which may be
adopted for postdated instruments. The court properly disregarded the
obvious fact that there had been an inadvertent misdating in Boehm v.
Sterling, 7 Durnf. & E. 423 (1797), where it was evident that the intent was
to postdate several months, but by error in the year written the bill was
actually antedated.
22Supra note 16, at 522, There is some evidence in the case of the
drawer's expecting, perhaps intending, that Totty should "pay it the next
day at Doneaster," that is, deposit or transfer it then. In the absence of an




In spite, nevertheless, of the seemingly misplaced emphasis on
the death of the payee, the confusing presence of the stamp tax
question regarding validity, and the not too satisfactory reasons
given by the court for its decision, Pasmore v. North remains
the squarest and strongest of the English cases on the general
subject of postdated commercial paper. As later to be observed,
it does not necessarily cover the case of postdated checks.
In Robinson v. Benkel,23 the plaintiff, a broker, bought from a
bankrupt gambler named Harley certain postdated checks of the
defendant given in payment of wagers. These facts being
shown, the plaintiff was obligated to prove himself a holder in
due course. Horridge, J., having disposed of the stamp issue
which had been raised, then dealt with the question of notice in
the following interesting language: "The difficulty of taking
postdated cheques from a man he knew to have been a bankrupt
was gotten rid of by the fact that during the last few months
he had discounted other cheques for him and they had always
been met."
Here is an intimation clearly enough that if past transactions
had not served to lull the plaintiff into confidence, he might have
been chargeable with notice of some defect because he took
postdated checks from a known bankrupt. One wonders where
the emphasis is laid, on the character of the check or on the
character of the transferor. If the former, the learned judge
leaned to the view that a postdated check, while valid and nego-
tiable, is not regular, or at least that it is notice on its face of
possible defenses, though such leanings are certainly not in har-
mony with the orthodox English views on the subject. If the
latter, it suggests a reversion to the discredited rule of Gill v.
Cubit 24-an. unlikely move at this date. The possible irregular-
ity of the paper was not considered, but the result is opposed to
such a view, for it is not perceived how the drawee's payment
in due course after their date of some checks originally postdated
could protect one in the premature purchase of other like instru-
ments. That fact might be material, however, if the question
was one of notice or simply a fact question of the buyer's good
faith; and perhaps this last is all that the language means
anyway.
But the most interesting of the British cases are three from
Australasia, wherein the arguments struck directly at the effec-
tiveness of postdating for any purpose. In Hincheliffe v. Ballarat
Banking Company,25 a lower court of Victoria held that to post-
date a check is to mislead the drawee bank, and the bank, there-
23 29 T. L. R. 475 (1913).
24 3 B. & C. 466 (1824). Cf. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howy. 343 (U. S.
1857).,
1 25 1 Vict. L. R. 229 (1870).
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fore, should not be the loser if it pays such a check before the
date it bears and in consequence dishonors a subsequent check
because of the depleted state of the drawer's account. But the
Supreme Court reversed this decision. It held that the bank
must observe the date, because otherwise it would be allowed
to pay a bill before it was due, since a postdated check is a bill.
The bank was negligent and must respond in damages.
But when a similar question was presented to a Queensland
court some twenty-five years later, a contrary result was reached
in two opinions which bristle with novel ideas on the subject20
Conceding that prior to the codification of the law merchant the
bank could not be justified in the practice of prepaying postdated
instruments, the opinion of Griffith, C. J., lays weight on Section
14 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1884 (which provides that
unless the contrary is proved, the date appearing on a negotiable
instrument will be considered the true date) 27 as support for the
view that the true date of the check in question could be shown
to be the date when it was delivered to the payee. The check
then being an instrument payable on demand after its true date
was payable immediately on issuance without regard to the date
written upon it. It is difficult to accept this reasoning and con-
clusion, for the section making the written date prima, frcie the
true issuing date was apparently addressed to the burden of
proof in the case of an instrument whose date had been altered, -2
and the reasoning was not altogether supported by the other
judges, for one of them in a concurring opinion presented
grounds of his own for reaching the result.2-
26 Magill v. Bank of N. Queensland, 6 Queens. L. J. 262 (1895), com-
mented on favorably in (1920) 64 SOL. J. 597, and in fact announcing the
doctrine previously suggested by that periodical, Post-dated Chcques (1883)
27 SOL. J. 194, although the more recent article seems not to have been
aware of it. See also arguments of counsel in Forster v. Mackreth, L. I.
2 Ex. 163, 165 (1867).
2 7 BILLs OF EXCHANGo Acr (Eng. 1882) § 13 (1); NEsGOLMBL I. snRU-
MENTS LAW § 11: "Where the instrument or an'acceptance or any indorze-
ment thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true date
of the making, drawing, acceptance, or indorsement as the case may be."
28 See National City Bank v. Shelton Electric Co., 96 Wash. 74, 164 Pac.
933 (1917).
29 He refused to decide whether the instrument was a bill payable on
demand from the moment of issue or on demand after its date. If the
former, the bank's right to pay was clear, and if the latter, the bank was
entitled to accept the check before its date and thereafter to dishonor other
checks, and also the bank might pay it before its date "from its own funds"
and hence without the privilege of charging it against the depositor at that
time. It is believed that this latter reasoning will not bear the light of
analysis. First, as to acceptance, even if contrary to American prac-
tice the bank can lawfully bind itself by accepting a time instrument with-
out debiting the depositor's account to cover the acceptance, no reason ap-
pears -why it should then be permitted to dishonor other earlier maturing
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In 1901 this case was disapproved by the New Zealand Court
-of Appeal, where exactly the same problem was raised.30 One
of the opinions warrants examination. Williams, J., considered
that if the Queensland reasoning were adopted, a holder could
sue on the postdated instrument before its date, a result to which
he was unwilling to yield assent. But in this particular he
overlooked the most striking feature of the Queensland decision.
Whether the bank may justifiably pay without regard to the
date is one problem. Whether a holder can demand payment and
treat the refusal as a dishonor is another. Whether he is a
holder in due course and free from "equities" is still another.
Logic does not demand that these problems be resolved together;
neither necessarily does business policy. If postdating affects
the decision on any of them, there are still postdated checks to
be reckoned with. Griffith, C. J., in the discredited Queensland
case, saw this distinction, for, to counsel's contention that the
decision does away with postdated checks, he made ready answer
no, because one who takes the check has notice that the person
having it in possession may have no right to it ("It is a document
which is apparently not in circulation as a negotiable instru-
ment") and so takes that risk, but if it later turns out that the
person had a right to it, the risk proves to be nothing.," The
reasoning of the learned judge is exactly and strikingly appli-
cable to non-negotiable paper where a defect of title is concerned.
Here then, in a case which has been misunderstood as prac-
tically abolishing postdated checks, is a dictum according more
effectiveness to the postdating than is usually granted and sug-
gesting much the same policy on the particular point as that
presented by the present article for consideration.
It is not intended here to approve the decision in the Queens-
land case. Since due diligence by a drawee requires observance
of the date of a draft along with all other material matters on
its face, the bank should be required to refuse payment on post-
dated instruments until their date arrives.32 And such it is
understood is the practice. But the Queensland decision is far
from announcing a curious and indefensible rule as a first read.
checks on the still undepleted account. Second, if the bank "pays" the
instrument "from its own funds," i.e., without charging the customer's ac-
count, such a transaction is a purchase, not payment, and there still ap-
pears no reason why regular checks presented prior to the date of the post-
dated check should not be honored.
30 Pollack v. Bank of New Zealand, 20 N. Z. L. R. 174 (1901).
31 Magill v. Bank of N. Queensland, supra note 26, at 264.
32 "If a banker pays a check before it is due, he is not protected." Parke,
B., on argument in Morley v. Culverwell, 7 M. & W. 174 (1840). Accord:
Commercial Bank of Scotland v. Henderson, 13 Scot. L. Rev. & Sher. Ct.
Rep. 136 (1897) (depositor who gave notice to stop payment before the date
of the check allowed to recover the amount thereof from the drawee bank
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ing might suggest. It is novel and perhaps not advisable; that
is all. The best reason which can be given for the rule seems to
be the one which grounded the lower Victorian court in its
judgment, later reversed, in the Hinchcliffe Case-that the
depositor misleads the bank, that he owes a duty not to so draw
checks as to increase the likelihood of slips in the volume of
business done. And a junior bank officer in an American city
emphatically expressed a like opinion when asked concerning
the payment of such items, without ever having heard of a
decision on the question. The paying teller and bookkeeper
would, of course, be relieved of one responsibility by such a state
of the law, and the work of the bank be speeded up in some
measure, but a banker's view, though honestly entertained, is
prejudiced by a lively appreciation of his own problems, and a
solution must be arrived at only when his opinion is weighed
with those of others whose interests are at stake. One effect of
a decision like that in the Queensland case would undoubtedly be
to discourage the drawing of postdated checks-a laudable
accomplishment in itself but entailing sacrifice of some cherished
conveniences from that form of instrument. In the light of the
cases considered above and others, both British and colonial,
which are summarized in a note, 3 it would seem definitely estab-
lished in the British Empire that a postdated check is a negoti-
able and regular commercial instrument from the moment of
its issue, and the future date upon it is not considered notice to
an indorsee of the drawer's possible defenses against the payee.
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1) Those Prior to the Negotiable Instru2ments Law
The early American cases, being free from foreign stamp
entanglements, did not usually go off on the matter of validity,
which had already paid it and charged his account). Here there wa; n:
holder in due course unless the drawee were such; cf. The Stag Co. v. Union
Bank of Chicago, 201 Ill. App. 510 (1916). In Godin v. Bank of the Com-
monwealth, 6 Duer 76 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1856), a like recovery was per-
mitted but in favor of one to whom the bank balance had been assigned
before the date of the postdated checks in question but after their "pay-
ment" by the drawee defendant. See Crawford v. West Side Bank, 17 Jon.
& S. 68, 72 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1883), containing, however, a dictum that
the drawee could then recover of the drawer. It has been held in Germany
that a bank which pays a postdated check before its date must bear the
risk of a subsequent stop payment order and must refund to the holder
whose messenger collected the check and absconded, the holder having taken
an assignment from the drawer. CoInM1CIAL L.*ws OF THE WORfLD, GEr-
mLAY, 483.
- Currie v. MIisa, supra note 4; Watson v. Poulson, s pra note 5. In
neither of these cases was the suit on the postdated instrument. One was
on an ordinary check given in payment of a postdated bill, or in response
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and accordingly they presented more squarely the simple question
of a holder's rights in the face of a maker's personal defenses,
Occasionally, it is true, the court declared the postdated instru-
ment to be valid and let the case go at that,34 while at other times
the check was simply said to be a negotiable instrument, or the
taker 9holder in due course, or the maker precluded from setting
to a postdated message or memorandum, as the court seems to have re-
garded it. The other was an action in tort for the fraud of the drawer in
issuing a postdated check on which he had stopped payment because of
failure of consideration before the purchaser of the check for value was
able to get it cashed. Parke, B., regarded the stopping of payment as
"justified," which probably did not mean that the drawer could have set
up the defense had he been sued on the check. Cf. Royal Bank of Scotland
v. Tottenham, supra note 10 (suit by purchaser for value before its date
of check drawn by defendant; no evidence of defenses; claim that plaintiffs
should not recover because they took it insufficiently stamped; held, valid
and admissible and that plaintiff might recover); Wood v. Stephenson, 10
U. C. Q. B. 419 (1858) (suit by purchaser of check for value before date;
defense of failure of consideration; held, valid and that plaintiff might
recover); followed in Union Bank v. Tattersall, 52 D. L. R. 409, 411 (1920) ;
Hutley v. Peacock, 30 T. L. R. 42 (1913) (cheek of minor drawn and de-
livered before, but dated after, becoming of age; treated as a bill; defense
of infancy sustained; and therefore nothing decided on question of negotia-
bility or regularity). In Stirling v. John, [1923]. 1 K. B. 557 postdated
checks were deposited with a money lender for the purpose of paying up
installments of the drawer's debt as they came due; no question of whether
the checks were negotiable was involved, but solely whether they were
"securities" for the payment of money within the meaning of certain stat-
utes regulating the business of money lending. Younger, L. J., called them
"negotiable instruments" but obviously meant simply that they were com-
mercial paper in a general sense. Cf. Russell v. Hellaby, [1922] N. Z. L.
R. 186 (suit by payee, hence no question of negotiation; check postdated
to enable drawer to try out car sold to him before final payment). Other
decisions from the far stretches of the Empire for the most part contribute
little. Most of them turned on the revenue laws, and whatever they may
add by way of cumulative weight to the English view is discounted by the
fact that the colonial courts were but following the decisions at Westmin-
ster, or attempting to follow them. In the following cases no defense on
the merits was made out and the decision hinged on the validity or invalid-
ity of the bill otherwise, as, e.g., under the stamp acts: Ramen Chatty v.
Mahomed Ghouse, Indian L. R. 16 Calc. 432 (1889) (held admissible in
evidence, following English test of appearance at trial); Chartered Mech.
Bank v. Silva & Co., [1866] Rama Nathan's Ceyl. R. 199 (no right of action
on insufficiently stamped postdated check by one who took with knowledge
of fact); Krishnappa Chetty v. Carpen Chetty, 15 Ceyl. New L. R. 243
(1912) (contra, on ground of change in statute); Alexander v. Sheth, 6
So. Afr. 162 (1899); Van Graan v. Buytendag, [1907] Transvaal L. R.
550 (Sup. Ct.) (promissory note; urged that plaintiff was not a holder in
due course because the instrument was not complete and regular when he
took it; but defendant having no defenses on the merits, the declaration of
the court that it was complete and regular as an instrument-independent
of stamps-is of less force than otherwise it would be).
The case of Jochelsohn, Yamey & Co. v. Mahomed, [1916] So. Afr. L. R.
Cape Prov. Div. 233, decided only that the mistaken taking of a postdated
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up defenses, and all debate on those questions foreclosed by the
judicial pronouncement 5
But when any reasoning at all was indulged in, it was usually
directed to the question of whether the presence on an instru-
ment, in general form negotiable, of a date yet in the future is
notice of equities existing between the original parties, whether
it is a suspicious circumstance on the paper. Thus, in the earliest
American case on the general subject of postdated instruments,
suit being upon a promissory note, the trial judge "charged the
jury that the negotiation of the note, before the day when it
bore date, was a strong circumstance of suspicion, sufficient to
put the plaintiff upon inquiry, and that he therefore took it
subject to any defense which might have been made had the
suit been brought by the original payees"; while on appeal a
contrary opinion was expressed by Sutherland, J., as follows:
"There is no legal objection either to antedating or postdating a
note, and I am not prepared to say that either is, in itself, and
disconnected from other circumstances, a legal ground of sus-
picion, so as to put the indorsee upon inquiry, and subject him
to all the equities existing between the original parties." 3 This
decision was followed and substantially the same language used
in a later case where the instrument was a check instead of a
note. 3T
To the same effect, though phrased in terms of notice rather
than of suspicious circumstances, is a dictum of the Supreme
Court of Indiana in another case where the maker had requested
delay in collecting an ordinary check, not postdated, and the
holder knew of such request. "We cannot see that the transac-
tion carries a more distinct warning of fraud to a possible
check by a creditor who thinks it immediately payable does not bar his
suit on the original debt when payment of the check is refused.
Bishendas Monghirmal v. Akbar Khan, 8 E. Afr. L. 1R. 15G (1920) deals
-with a bill of sale (mortgage) of cattle as security for a loan of Rs 5000.
A statute required every bill of sale to set forth truly the consideration,
and the court treated a statement that the Rs 5000 were "now paid" as
false when some part of that sum was in postdated checks. The court
seems by this decision to classify the postdated check as a cash instrument
operative as payment only as of its future date rather than as a credit
instrument so operating when delivered. One wonders whether he would
have held likewise of a time bill intended for immediate discount. See
Post-Dated Cheques (1913) 136 LAw TiaEs 59.
34 Frazier v. Trow's Ptg. & Bkbdg. Co., 24 Hun 281 (N. Y. 1881).
35Jacks v. Darrin, 3 Sm. 557 (N. Y. 1854); Anderson v. Shoup,
17 Ohio St. 125 (1866) semble; Burns v. Kahn & Furst, 47 lMIo. App. 215
(1891); Bill v. Stewart, 156 Mass. 508, 31 N. E. 386 (1892); Wilson v.
McEachern, 9 Ga. App. 584, 71 S. E. 946 (1911); see Walker v. Geisse, 4
Whart. 252, 257 (Pa. 1839) (not necessary to a decision of the case but
following Pasmore v. North, supra note 16).
36 Brewster v. McCardel, 8 Wend. 478 (N. Y. 1832).
37 Meyer v. Mode, 14 Hun 155 (N. Y. 1878).
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purchaser than would a postdated check; or a memorandum
check .... Neither a postdated check nor a memorandum
check in themselves are notice of fraud in putting them in cir-
culation sufficient to destroy the bona fides of a purchaser for
value." 31
It will be seen, therefore, that in American cases not governed
by the Negotiable Instruments Law the courts have touched
upon two of the problems presented for consideration herein,
i.e., (1) whether a postdated check is negotiable and (2) whether
the date constitutes notice of possible defenses, though this latter
point was at times discussed as a question of suspicious circum-
stances. The decisions on these points were reached chiefly in
reliance on English precedents and without examination of
American business practice. The third of the questions raised
at the opening of this paper, i.e., that concerning the irregularity
of a postdated check, did not become recognized as a separate
issue until after the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
whose provisions are now to be examined.
(2) The Negotiable Instruments Law
This codification of, the law merchant did little to clarify the
problem of postdated checks.
"A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand." 3 , But far from proving that a postdated check is,
vhen issued, a regular bill of exchange payable at a future time,
this language goes only so far as to indicate that a postdated
check is not when issued a regular check, perhaps not really a
check at all, for nothing could be clearer than that, whatever else
it may be, it is not then payable on demand. A bank would
violate a duty to its customer by paying it and charging the cus-
tomer before the date it bore, 0 and a certification would be
equally unauthorized if accompanied by the usual practice of
tying up the depositor's account in part to meet the check.4'
Nor will much support for the view that a postdated check is
a regular and negotiable instrument be found in the other sec-
tions of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It may well be
conceded that, as provided by Section 6, the negotiable character
38 Johnson v. Harrison, 177 Ind. 240, 251, 97 N. E. 930, 934 (1912) ; of.
dictum in Pope v. Bank of Albion, supra note 1, at 130, to the effect that
one who purchased the postdated check in question "might certainly have
been charged with notice of some irregularity, on account of receiving it
before the day of its date." But that check had been certified, See also
infra note 55.
39 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 185; so also English and Canadian
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AcT § 73.
4OSupra note 32.
41 But cf. Smith v. Field, supra note 1.
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would not be affected by the absence of any date,^ for that is
not in issue, there being in fact a date on the paper; its being
there is, under another section, a material feature of the check,
not subject to alteration -3 and required to be observed by takers,
as is the amount. For the same reason no light is shed on the
question by Section 17, which offers rules of construction for
undated instruments."' And a glance at Section 13, also dealing
with dating of undated time instruments, is all that is needed to
show that it does not fit the case. 5 So too, Section 1, providing
as a condition of negotiability that the instrument must be
payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time,4G
does not determine the problem, for, while it is conceded that
the time is sufficiently fixed by the postdating, nothing is thereby
proved as to regularity. And even negotiability is not finally
established by meeting one of the conditions for its existence.
It may be further granted, without affecting the issue, that
an instrument is not invalid because antedated or postdated 47
for it is not contended in the United States that a postdated
check is invalid.48 The question is whether during the interim it
is either non-negotiable, irregular, or notice of defenses. But
while this language of Section 12 fails entirely to prove anything
2 The English and Canadian acts provide only that the bill is not invalid
because undated. BRAxNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUZSENTS LAW (3d ed. 1920)
26, n. 1; RUSSELL, BLts (2d ed. 1921) 113; Canadian BmLs OF EXCHAI.GE
Acr § 27 (a).
4 3 NEGoTIAELE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 125. See Stephens v. Graham 7 S. &
R. 505 (Pa. 1822).
44 NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS LAW § 17: "Where the language of the in-
strument is ambiguous, or there are omissions therein, the following rules
of construction apply: . . . 3. Where the instrument is not dated, it
will be considered to be dated as of the time it was issued." This, of
course, is just what cannot be "considered" when a date appears on the
face-even though for some purpose evidence were admitted as to the true
date of first handing over or delivery.
4r Ibid. § 13; of. BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT § 12.
46 Relied on in Manos v. Eassy, 124 S. C. 154, 117 S. E. 222 (1923). But
see the argument of Mullan, J., concurring in Kuftik v. Vaccaro, infta note
49, that a postdated check is not payable at "a determinable future time"
as defined in Negotiable Instruments Law, § 4, and hence does not qualify
as negotiable.
47 NEGoTABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 12; BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT (Eng.)
§ 13 [2]; BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT (Can.) § 27 (d).
4r This is all that is decided on the point by American Agricultural Chem.
Co. v. Scrimger, 130 Mld. 389, 396, 100 Atl. 774, 776 (1917), wherein it
was said, "A postdated check is a perfectly legal and proper instru-
ment ... 1" It is true, of course, as held in that case, that in the absence
of collusion to cheat creditors there is no duty on the part of a drawer of
postdated checks to stop payment on them for the benefit of a garnishing
creditor of the payee. Ex parte Richdale, supra note 9; Elwell v. Jackson,
1 Cab. & E. 362 (1884) (likewise as to ordinary check); cf. Wilson v. Me-
Eachern, supra note 35; Fulweiler v. Hughes, 17 Pa. 440 (1851).
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favorable to the negotiability of postdated instruments, it does,
when set side by side with that of Section 6 already mentioned,
offer a foothold for an argument that they are not negotiable.
The provisions are as follows: Section 6: "The validity and
negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the
fact that it is not dated." Section 12: "The instrument is not
invalid for the reason only that it is antedated or postdated
provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose."
(Italics ours).
Out of this group of sections dealing with dates there seems
then to be no compelling argument for or against negotiability.
As might be expected, therefore, the courts since the Negotiable
Instruments Law, in deciding that a postdated check is negoti-
able,49 have found little assistance in the Act, but have depended
largely on the earlier decisions already noticed.
As to the matter of notice, the Negotiable Instruments Law
has nothing specifically to say about postdated instruments. The
general provisions of Section 56 that, to constitute notice of
equities, the transferee must have had knowledge thereof or of
49 Symonds v. Riley, 188 Mass. 470, 74 N. E. 926 (1905); Albert v. Hoff-
man, 64 Misc. 87, 117 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; Kuflik v. Vaecaro,
103 Misc. 239, 170 N. Y. Supp. 13 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Triphonoff v. Sweeney,
65 Ore. 299, 130 Pac. 979 (1913) ; State v. Langer, inf'a note 58; Ameri-
can Nat Bank v. Wheeler, 45 Cal. App. 118, 187 Pac. 128 (1919) (check
issued before the Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted); Currie-Mc-
Graw Co. v. Friedman, 135 Miss. 701, 100 So. 273 (1924); cf. Jackes-Evans
Mfg. Co. v. Goss, 254 S. W. 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), This last case Is
one of the most remarkable that hds been found and presents a jury ver-
dict in a curiously unfavorable light. The defendant's check having been
drawn and delivered in December, 1920, but dated February 10, 1921, was
evidently indorsed before the latter date to the plaintiff company (so that
under the view of this article the instrument would be subject to the
drawer's defenses). This is exactly what the jury was determined to find;
but, having been instructed, it seems, that the check matured on the day
of its date and that to be a holder in due course the plaintiff must have
purchased before maturity, it found against the clearest evidence that the
plaintiff company "did not get" the check until "after February 10, 1921"
and so was not a holder free from equities. The appellate court reversed
the judgment on this flagrant misfinding of the facts without even an
allusion to the elementary proposition of law that the check would have been
negotiable for some time after its date and that the very facts which the
jury found would make the plaintiff a holder in due course whether he
would have been so before its date or not. Under any interpretation of the
evidence the plaintiff could not have taken the check more than two or
three days after its date and even under the strictest holdings it would have
continued negotiable for a much longer time. NEGoTIAL= INSTRUMENTS
LAW §§ 53, 199; Anderson v. Elem, 111 Kan. 713, 208 Pac. 573 (1922) (24
days not an unreasonable time). If the trial court had not certainly misled
the jury and the jury as certainly determined, whatever the evidence, to
exempt their fellow Texan from the claims of a St. Louis corporation, the




such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to
bad faith,c° has not prevented courts treating matters appearing
on the face of the instrument as the equivalent of actual knowl-
edge; 5 but the courts in dealing with postdated instruments
under this provision have not regarded the date as notice of the
drawer's equities under the Negotiable Instruments Law any
more than they did before.52
We turn next to the matter of regularity. The Negotiable
Instruments Law defines a holder in due course as one who,
among other things, has taken an instrument "complete and
regular on its face." 53 Since no test of regularity is laid down,
it would be a fair enough inference that guidance should here
be sought from the commercial world. But counsel and judges
who care what merchants think or understand about a question
which lawyers have taken unto themselves as one of law are a
rarity since the day of Lord Mlansfield. No such investigation
seems ever to have been made or thought of; indeed, no question
of the regularity of postdated instruments seems ever to have
been seriously pressed upon the attention of a court.r Inquiry
0 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 56: "To constitute notice of an in-
firmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the
same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge
of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in tak-
ing the instrument amounted to bad faith." The subjective nature of the
test is most forcibly put by Mr. Justice Mlack's remark in Schintz v. Amer-
ican Trust & Say. Bank, 152 Ill. App. 76, 78 (1909).
5 See Rightmire, Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Instrumentc
(1920) 18 MicH. L. Rnv. 355, 364.
52Albert, Triphonoff, and Currie-McGraw cases, mipra note 49; State v.
Langer, infra note 58. In Pingree Nat. Bank v. McFarland, 57 Utah 410,
418, 195 Pac. 313, 317 (1921) the court declined to decide whether "certain
defenses may not be interposed against a postdated check which are not
available against a check payable at the date of issue."
5 Supra note 14.
54 The difference between regularity and notice is pointed out in Note
(1922) 22 COL. L. Rnv. 159, wherein the following brief test is announced:
"Regularity depends on how desirable and frequent it is in businezs to post-
date checks." It seems to be more accurate to say that regularity depends
on how desirable and frequent it is to transfer postdated checks and make
them serve as a medium of exchange.
5 In Wilson v. Mid-West State Bank, 193 Iowa 311, 314, 186 N. W. 891,
893 (1922) Judge Weaver remarked, "Moreover, the check in this instance
was postdated by a matter of about three weeks, and therefore irregular
and unauthorized, and not in due course of business. It carries the notice
of its defect upon its face, and he who takes it holds it subject to that objec-
tion." The check in question had been certified, and so would be brought
within the rules mentioned supra note 1, but the case went further than
that. The drawer, having sued her bank to prevent payment of the certi-
fied check and debit to her account, was allowed to prevail over the holder
who intervened and made claim of being an innocent purchas-er. The court
was evidently satisfied that the intervener failed to prove himself a pur-
chaser in good faith.
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by the writer, however, over several years and over a wide area
has brought from bankers, merchants, and business men the
assertion most often that postdated checks are irregular-al-
though that view is by no means unanimous.
Perhaps a better test of regularity than what commercial men
say about such paper is what they do with it. It is here that the
results of a recent investigation may prove of value. No reliable
way exists of finding out how many postdated checks are written
or what per cent they are of all checks, but they are evidently
a good many in the aggregate although only a small percentage
of the whole. 6 A record of the number deposited with any bank
or presented to the drawee for payment would reveal little, since
those items would be the ones which slipped through by oversight
and the great bulk would evidently be held and put through when
they are no longer postdated57 A personal interview with offi-
cers of half a dozen banks in one large northern city disclosed
none who would consider for an instant either discounting post-
dated instruments before their date or accepting them as col-
lateral security to a loan, while one emphatically asserted that
he would not even accept them for collection-doubtless an over-
statement of the position of his institution. Scattering inquiries
of bankers both north and south, in large places and small, dis-
closed an almost identical sentiment. And on top of this the
banking superintendents and examiners in twenty states,"a
including those in which are situated most of the large commer-
cial centers, knew of no such practice in their respective
1G "The practice of accepting postdated checks in this city is almost as
common as the selling of merchandise." (Letter from firm of adjustors in
New York City) But other letters suggest that in some communities at
least the practice is far from common.
57A very large bank in Chicago made a five-day observation and reported
thirteen postdated checks out of an approximate total of 160,000 checks
presented for payment during that period. Similar observations for one
week by a medium-sized bank, handling the business of smaller merchants
in Cleveland, showed from four to thirteen postdated checks out of approxi-
mately 5,000 daily. The attitude of these banks was strongly to discourage
the use of such checks, the larger bank stating that it would request the
termination of the account of a depositor who persisted in giving them.
58 California, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvahia, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Wasbington. The case of North Dakota is of particular interest because
it is reported that some banks in that state during the Non-Par-
tisan League regime had held postdated checks as security to loans.
State v. Langer, 46 N. D. 462, 488, 177 N. W. 408, 419 (1919). The present
state examiner, Hon. Gilbert Semingson, while, of course, accepting the
declaration of law in that decision to the effect that postdated checks are
negotiable and may be used as collateral security, states that the case cited
"had to do with an unusual situation .... The practice of carrying post-
dated checks as collateral has not been general at any time... Their use,
if any, is negligible. None has come to our attention for many years."
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jurisdictions and all but thiree condemned it with varying degrees
of warmth.
So much for the banking world. Among merchants a less
unified front is presented but the problem is different with them.
There is usually the sales element in their case, and a desire to
move goods at a profit may cause them to take known and un-
known risks. Furthermore, the problem may be presented to
them in either of two ways. They may be asked to take the
purchaser's own postdated check or, far less often, to take by
indorsement from him the like instrument of another person.
The first situation does not raise our problem, as there is no
transfer which might amount to a negotiation and there is
nothing usually involved but the credit of the drawer. The
storekeeper when interviewed usually states as to the first of
these situations that he would take without much hesitation the
postdated check of a man in whom he had confidence and that
on some occasions he had done so, understanding that he was
to make no use of it until its date. Some cautious merchants
state that they would refuse to take postdated checks from any-
one, perhaps due to the notion existing in some quarters that
they are .illegal. In the second situation the tradesman states
that he might (they are seldom certain) take the postdated check
of an unknown drawer from a known good endorser or the check
of a known good drawer from a person of unknown financial
standing. But on being asked if this last would be true in case
the drawer were, say, Henry Ford, they usually think they would
be suspicious and want to know why Mr. Ford postdated his
check since it would not seem to be for the usual reason-want
of present funds. Furthermore, these tradespeople, so far as
can be learned, generally make no effort to sell or pledge such
paper in advance of its date and they state that they know of no
market for it generally or any place where they could discount
or borrow on it.
Collection agencies for obvious reasons seem to receive more
postdated checks than any other business group, though some
do not encourage the giving of them. Inquiries were made of
seventy such concerns selected at random from the membership
of the Commercial Law League of America in fifty-five cities
and towns from coast to coast, including two in Canada, as to
the practice in respect of such paper and whether they ever sold
or discounted it or used it as collateral to loans. Sixty-eight
replied indicating a negative answer to the question, most of
them adding that they knew of no dealers or dealing in postdated
checks either in their community or elsewhere. One southern
writer saw no reason why the payee might not discount them if
he wanted to and could find a buyer, and one letter from an
important northern city suggested that "quite a business might
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be worked up handling postdated checks if it were properly
advertised"; but most opinions were decidedly to the contrary.
The practice seems to be that such checks are held in a sus-
pension file until the date fixed by the drawer (or according to
the system of some concerns, until just long enough before then
to assure their arrival at the drawee's counter on that date).
Finally inquiries were directed to a selected list of companies,
whose business included the financing of accounts receivable for
merchants, to learn if they either discounted or loaned against
postdated checks held by their customers or if not, whether they
knew of any such practice. Illuminating replies on the matters
in hand were received from eight companies located in the fol-
lowing cities: Los Angeles, Chicago, Indianapolis, New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Seven declared that they never
dealt in postdated paper and knew of no organization which did;
also that they would not consider it good business to do so. The
other company likewise reported that such financing arrange-
ments were not customary in their field and that they did not
make a practice themselves of discounting postdated checks or
taking them as collateral, but that "in special cases," apparently
rare, they had done so.
The isolated acts of one concern are not sufficient basis for any
general rules favorable to the free circulation of postdated
checks. Such transactions can, it seems, be adequately handled
by reliance on the transferror or on the collateral pledged.
Returning to the legal phases of the matter in the United
States,9 there can be no question but that the American courts
following English authority have adjudged postdated checks to
be negotiable from the time of issue. The decisions are also
agreed that the date on the paper is not notice of defenses. And
while the question of regularity seems never to have received any
serious attention in this country, the result of the cases are con-
sistent only with the rule that postdated checks are complete and
regular.
But the British cases were entangled with questions of stamps,
and their analysis was inadequate. The language of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law does not compel a holding that a post-
dated check is negotiable at the date of issue; indeed there is an
59 Cases decided under bad check laws have relatively little bearing on
the presentJ problem when thiy hold as do the majority that postdated
checks are not within the condemnation of the acts. Smith v. State, 147
Ark. 49, 226 S. W. 531 (1921). But it should not be overlooked that thoso
cases which treat such paper as within the reach of the penal statutes
practically prevent the use of postdated checks as credit instruments. Peo-
ple v. Bercovitz, 163 Cal. 636, 126 Pac. 479 (1912); Commonwealth v.
Woolis, 15 Del. Co. Rep. 549 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1921); State v. Avery, 111




argument for a contrary interpretation. Other instruments in
good commercial standing, as, e.g., bills or notes payable at the
drawer's bank, o supply all the features of the postdated' check
as a credit instrument. Finally and most of all, the business
world does not currently transfer and "negotiate" postdated
checks in due course. " Why then should postdated checks be
legally classified as negotiable? Or if the weight of precedent
seems too heavy on that point, why should they be classified as
regular? 61
Probably no one would think it desirable to have rules of busi-
ness law radically different from what the business community
would expect them to be. Commercial paper came to be recog-
nized not because judges decided that money contracts should be
of three classes, simple contracts, bonds, and negotiable instru-
ments, but because the commercial world utilized bills and notes
as money and ran its transactions on that basis; so it was that
the ideas and expectations of merchants were of weight even
after "the custom of merchants" had become "the law merchant"
of the courts. Accordingly it is believed that any study of the
law of postdated checks should be conducted in the light of what
the business world thinks about such paper and, still more impor-
tant, what it does with it. This article undertakes a start in that
direction.
Go NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 87. A commercial banking firm in
Baltimore stated its position as follows: "In our estimation it is not good
business to discount postdated checks. In the event a merchant should
be in need of money, we would much prefer to discount his note or his
customer's notes and trade acceptances."
61 The conclusion in Comment (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 321, 325, "that post-
dated checks should find fuller recognition and come to fill their particular
place of usefulness among the different types of commercial paper" is be-
lieved to be erroneous in so far as it commends them as credit instrumentz
before their date.
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